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**THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

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National Intelligence Council

NIC #02109-84

3 April 1984

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Montgomery L. Rogers
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Response to Your Request for Updates
on Africa

Forwarded herewith are responses to your
queries concerning Libyan activities in Africa
and the state of play in southern Africa.


Montgomery L. Rogers

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QADHAFI'S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

SUDAN - There have been no spectacular Libyan actions since the 16 March plane incident where an attempt was made to bomb the Sudanese radio station in Omdurman. Qadhafi's propaganda war against Nimeiri has been upgraded and the Libyans continue to provide material assistance to the anti-Nimeiri southern dissidents based in Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the fighting in the south has increased and the onset of the rainy season will impede the government's counterinsurgency campaign.

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CHAD - Libyan activity in Chad over the past weeks has centered on three general areas:

- (1) The Libyans have been consolidating their administrative and military hold on northern Chad. Reports from refugees from northern Chad who have moved to the south tell of Arabic being taught in the schools and Libyan currency replacing Chadian money. The Libyans are improving the military logistical network by such activity as improving or building new dirt airstrips.
- (2) Improving defensive positions and strengthening air defenses. This would give Qadhafi improved options for supporting offensive operations by the anti-Habre dissidents if he chose to reopen the fighting.
- (3) Infiltrating arms and supplies to dissident bands in the south and east who, while not pro-Libyan, are anti-Habre.

Qadhafi has also intimated that a terrorist campaign might be mounted against the French presence in Chad and elsewhere in West Africa. A bomb damaged a UTA (French) airplane at N'Djamena airport after the passengers had been discharged. Two Libyans reportedly were arrested in the Central African Republic for suspected involvement in placing the bomb on the plane before it took off from Bangui for N'Djamena. Two explosions recently damaged Zaire's radio facilities and post office building. It is not yet certain that the explosions were the work of the Libyans, but if so, it could signal Qadhafi's displeasure with Mobutu's strong support to Habre. Mobutu is undoubtedly a priority target of Qadhafi, as evidenced by a terrorist incident at the Kinshasa airport earlier this year that was linked to the Libyans. The U.S. Embassy in N'Djamena has also been threatened.

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NIGERIA - Nigeria has indeed talked to the Libyans about a \$2 billion loan, although it is not clear whether the talks have reached the negotiating stage. The Nigerians have sent a delegation to Tripoli to talk, and there is a report that Qadhafi's number two man--Jallud--may be coming to Lagos for talks in early April. Despite this apparent motion, there are stumbling blocks ahead. We do not know the precise nature of the terms the Libyans are asking, but they apparently want Nigerian support for Qadhafi's Chad policy. There is yet no clear indication of the Nigerian position on this issue, but it is doubtful they would agree to support the Libyan line. The Nigerians are also talking to the Saudis about a \$2 billion loan. The Nigerians are no doubt aware of Qadhafi's failure to follow through on loan offers and may be using the Libyan offer to bargain with the Saudis. They need all the money they can get.

Ethiopian Activities

There are no new aspects to the Ethiopian effort to undermine Nimeiri. Mengistu continues as before to provide bases to anti-Nimeiri insurgents and facilitates the shipment of Libyan aid to the insurgents. There have been low-level clashes with the Somalis along the border but no significant military operations have resulted.

Mengistu, along with his demoralized army, continues to have no success in subduing the Tigrean and Eritrean insurgents. The military has been preparing for a new campaign in Eritrea but the offensive continues to be postponed, no doubt because of the apathy of the military forces stationed in Eritrea and the poor capabilities of the "press-ganged" youths who have been impressed into the military to serve as replacements in Eritrea.

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STATE OF PLAY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAExecutive Summary

The state of play in southern Africa currently focuses on a non-aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, a disengagement agreement between South Africa and Angola, and a continuingly effective guerrilla war waged against the MPLA government by UNITA. The non-aggression pact with Mozambique is attractive to both parties and has a good chance to work. If it does not, South Africa will exercise its option of resuming covert support to RENAMO thus invalidating the "golden handshake." The disengagement agreement with Angola, more fragile than the pact with Mozambique, may take another month to implement but is also advantageous to the parties concerned. It should last through the 1984 U.S. presidential elections but could break down after that if South Africa does not proceed with independence for Namibia. Meanwhile, UNITA is demonstrating that it is a force to be reckoned with and can be expected to continue its dramatic military strikes until the MPLA Government acknowledges that a political solution is the only answer to Angola's enormous problems. These are the real developments in southern Africa. The rest is talk and speculation based on limited intelligence.

The speculative aspects focus on a package deal leading to the independence of Namibia and involving a complex of elements including withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola, withdrawal of the South Africans from Namibia, U.S. recognition of the MPLA regime, reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA governments, and the question of who will lead an independent Namibia. Nothing will be decided until the U.S. and Angola sit down again for a second round of talks, and even then there is no certainty that progress will be made. So far no date for these discussions has been set, but as a minimum, Round II will not begin until South Africa completes the disengagement of its forces from Angola--probably around the end of April 1984.

The issue of Cuban withdrawal is the first issue to be resolved in the next round of talks between the U.S. and Angola. Any MPLA Government agreement to a phased withdrawal of Cubans from Angola would probably be in conjunction with a South African agreement to withdraw from Namibia, implement UNSCR 435 and cease support to UNITA. The South Africans might agree to this but probably not before the end of the year when they have exhausted alternatives to a SWAPO-led independent Namibia. The Soviets, Cubans and hardliners may also go along with this package providing their access rights and influence in Angola are not seriously jeopardized. Reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA is a larger question but must be resolved.

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State of Play in Southern Africa

South Africa's recent accommodations to both Mozambique and Angola were made partly in response to pressure from the United States and partly because Pretoria saw advantages to these agreements. The U.S. motivation was to keep the Mozambicans moving away from the Soviets and to re-energize the talks with Angola on Namibia (the South African military presence in Angola was a sticking point). The South Africans lost little in the process and achieved a promise from the two antagonists to rein in terrorist groups (the ANC and SWAPO) operating against them. Additionally, South Africa gained some diplomatic legitimacy and a diminishment of its international isolation.

For its part, South Africa agreed to cut off support to RENAMO (the South African-supported insurgent group operating against the Mozambican government) and to withdraw their troops from Angola. Prior to signing the non-aggression pact with Mozambique, however, South Africa provided a massive resupply of RENAMO designed to keep that organization operating on its own for the rest of this year. The South Africans will then have the option of continuing with the non-aggression pact and genuinely abandoning RENAMO if they think it is in their interest or of resuming covert support to RENAMO if they do not. (Our estimate is that RENAMO will wither without South African support.) Thus far, the indications are that South Africa wants to make the pact work.

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There is something in all this for the Mozambican and Angolan governments. President Machel sees the agreement as paving the way for substantial economic assistance from the West--he badly needs it. Economic mismanagement, drought and hurricanes have left the Mozambican economy in shambles. Machel also sees a potential for obtaining relief from RENAMO attacks. Dos Santos sees his deal with the South Africans as a means of regaining sovereignty over part of his country as well as reducing the direct South African military threat that would permit his government to concentrate on fighting UNITA.

At this point, the disengagement agreement is all we have on the Angolan front and even that process is not complete. The South African military is still disengaging from southern Angola and will probably not be out of Angola before the middle or end of April.

What is clear is that until the South Africans do get out of Angola, there will be no further talks about Namibia. Even then we do not know for sure how far the South Africans or Dos Santos are willing or able to go in translating this disengagement treaty into real movement on the Namibian issue. There are some hopeful signs:

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- Dos Santos has already agreed in principle to another round of talks with the U.S. on the Namibian issue, this time to focus on such key issues as Cuban troop withdrawal, cessation of South African support to UNITA, and U.S. recognition of the MPLA government. No date has been set for this next round, but the timing is certainly connected with the disengagement agreement, with Dos Santos' recent trip to Cuba and with MPLA Sec. General Lucio Lara's recent trip to Moscow. From the South African side, the release from prison of SWAPO founder Toivo ya Toivo, new attempts to construct a viable internal Namibian political organization, and recent public remarks by P.W. Botha about the burden of Namibia on the South African economy may indicate that the South Africans have accepted the inevitability of an independent Namibia, even if they are not yet ready to grant it.

In discussing progress on the Namibian issue, there are three key problems to address:

- Cuban withdrawal;
- The question of whether South Africa is genuinely ready to turn loose of Namibia even if it means a SWAPO-dominated government; and
- MPLA willingness to share power with UNITA.

The Cuban Withdrawal Issue

Dos Santos and the moderates around him may accede to a phased withdrawal of the 25,000 Cuban combat troops providing they can be convinced that South Africa will withdraw its troops from Namibia, implement UNSCR 435, and stop supporting UNITA. So far, it appears that Dos Santos has the necessary support within his own government to pursue this general approach,

how flexible the hardliners in the MPLA

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are willing to be on these issues. The communique issued at the conclusion of the recent Dos Santos state visit to Havana spelled out fairly tough terms for Cuban withdrawal: South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia, implementation of UNSCR 435, cessation of South African support to UNITA, cessation of hostile acts against Angola by South Africa and the United States. According to the communique, only when those conditions are met would the Cubans begin a phased withdrawal. [] reports that Dos Santos had to be pressured to sign this communique. We, therefore, do not know what extent the conditions outlined in the communique reflect Dos Santos' and his government's view. If they fairly represent the MPLA position, then the Namibia process is in trouble because the South Africans will not begin a withdrawal from Namibia unless the Cubans also begin a withdrawal. A recent analysis by DDI/SOVA concludes that if the MPLA government asks the Cubans to leave, they will, and the Soviets and Angolan hardliners will not attempt to overthrow Dos Santos to prevent it. The Frontline States will support the Angolans on this issue. All this may be academic, however, because the MPLA government is not going to precipitously ask the Cubans to leave without realistic assurances from the South Africans about their intentions in

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Namibia, some solution to the UNITA problem which will not sacrifice the MPLA government now in power, and indications from the West that significant amounts of economic assistance will be available to rebuild the country.

South African Intentions Toward Namibia

If South Africa has accepted the inevitability of an independent Namibia, they do not appear to be ready to grant that independence. P.W. Botha and Pik Botha, who are calling the shots these days with the military following their lead, still appear to be seeking an alternative to a SWAPO-led government. The Multiparty Conference (MPC-coalition of internal Namibian parties) has not gained enough broad-based support to lead Namibia into independence and probably never will be a viable political instrument for the South Africans. South Africa's release from prison of SWAPO founder Toivo ya Toivo was probably designed to create a power struggle within SWAPO and thereby weaken that organization. It is too early to tell whether this tactic will be effective. There are arguments for South Africa biting the bullet and accepting a SWAPO-led independent Namibia: (1) it would relieve South Africa of an approximately \$1 billion per year economic burden; and (2) South Africa would still have considerable influence over a SWAPO-led Namibia through economic dependence and through South Africa's willingness to use military force to keep an independent Namibia in line. South Africa should have no more difficulty influencing a SWAPO-led Namibia than it did influencing a Marxist-controlled Mozambique which it handled quite well. Just as Castro needs to prepare the Cuban people for a possible Cuban withdrawal from Angola and wants to get the best deal possible, so P.W. Botha needs to prepare the South Africans for withdrawal from Namibia and wants to make the best arrangement possible for the security of South Africa. It may work, but it may take more time--at least through the 1984 U.S. elections--and perhaps beyond--from PW's optic.

The UNITA Factor

Finally, for all this to work, there must be some solution to the UNITA problem. Although the U.S. Department of State is not pressing the MPLA on this issue, the logic being followed by State is that there can be no Cuban withdrawal from Angola without a reconciliation between the MPLA government and UNITA. This is based on the perception that the Cubans are, in fact, an effective defensive deterrent to a total military victory by UNITA. UNITA believes this to be the case. We do not know whether the Angolans really believe the Cubans are essential or even a solution to stopping Savimbi (or whether the Soviet military advisors would be enough), but they claim that the Cubans are needed as long as South Africa continues to support UNITA. To answer this latter concern, part of State's Namibia package is a cessation of South African support to UNITA. This would come about concurrently with a Cuban withdrawal, and State believes it would still force a reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA because even without South African support, in a Cubanless Angola, UNITA would be able to militarily defeat the MPLA forces. State believes that the MPLA government recognizes, or will recognize this, and therefore will seek to establish a political solution with UNITA prior to

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the withdrawal of the Cubans. The Soviets would not necessarily lose all their influence or access rights under a MPLA/UNITA coalition government, although their presence may be significantly reduced. Furthermore, the Soviets still have a shot at influencing a SWAPO-led government in Namibia. The disastrous shape of the Angolan economy, the position of the Angolan army, continued UNITA successes, Frontline States support, and the actual structure of an MPLA/UNITA reconciliation are all factors which will influence the outcome on this question.

Despite the fact that State's strategy has been discussed with and allegedly agreed to by Savimbi, Savimbi does not appear to be resting on State's assurances that his interests will be protected. UNITA continues to demonstrate by aggressive and occasionally spectacular military actions that it is a force which must be reckoned with.

What is Real?

- The non-aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique is real. Whether it will last depends on how much economic assistance the West can pump into Mozambique and whether the "ideologues" in FRELIMO who are unhappy with Machel seek to undercut him.
- The "golden handshake" to RENAMO is not real, yet, in the sense that South Africa has not made an irrevocable decision to disassociate itself from RENAMO. They have massively resupplied the movement prior to signing the non-aggression pact and maintain the option of resuming support if the agreement with Mozambique breaks down. However, all indications are that both South Africa and Mozambique want this new relationship to work.
- The disengagement treaty between the South Africans and the Angolans is real and will probably work, although the process of disengaging may take another month. This agreement is more fragile than the agreement with Mozambique yet both sides see definite advantages in the arrangement. It is likely to hold at least through the November 1984 U.S. elections and may hold longer if South Africa decides to proceed towards independence for Namibia. If they do not, it is back to the salient again.
- UNITA will continue to make its presence felt through spectacular strikes in new areas. This is real.
- Other issues such as cessation of South African support to UNITA, South African acceptance of UNSCR 435, Cuban withdrawal, and reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA are very much up in the air. They are issues which involve many tough decisions from a complex of players. The best State can do is to keep the momentum going and tackle the issues step by step.

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Remarks

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Executive Secretary

Date



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28 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
 SUBJECT: Updates on Africa

1. Will you have two updates pulled together for me:

a. Qadhafi's activities against Sudan, against Chad, and anything else he may be doing in West Africa. I am particularly interested in the negotiations for a \$2 billion loan to Nigeria, reportedly conditional on Nigeria's help in Chad-related matters. Cover also Ethiopia's efforts against Sudan and Somalia and Ethiopia's own problems with the Eritreans and Tigreans.

b. Just what is the state of play in South Africa? How does it all fit together:

- South Africa's dealings with Mozambique,
- the South African support and "golden handshake" to the Mozambique resistance,
- the fight for leadership in SWAPO,
- Angola's deal with South Africa,
- South African support of Savimbi,
- Savimbi's increased aggressiveness,
- dos Santos' need for the Cubans,
- Cuban/Soviet attitude towards reducing Cuban presence.

In this complex picture, what is real?

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 William J. Casey

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